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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
the DIVISION OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION Jean A. Williams,
Director,
Appellant,
Case No. 19836
vs.
GAF CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation.
Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
On September 28, 1983, the appellant filed suit
against the respondent, alleging certain violations of the Utah
Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. Section 13-11-4
(Supp. 1983).

The respondent filed its answer on November 7,

1983, and then moved the District Court for Summary Judgment on
December 12, 19 83.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment was heard by
the District Court on January 13, 19 84, which took the case
under advisement.

On January 17, 19 84, the Court issued a

Memorandum Decision.

The Order granting Respondent's Motion

for Summary Judgment and dismissing Appellant's Complaint with
prejudice was entered as final on February 2, 1984.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's ruling
and an order remanding the case to the lower court for trial on
the issues presented herein.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
In June, 1974f Dr. Dewey MacKay contacted Pendleton
Builders for the purpose of arranging the installation of a new
roof on his home, which was located in Bountiful, Utah.

During

the negotiations prior to the installation of the roof,
Pendleton Builders showed Dr. MacKay GAF Corporation
promotional and sales materials about asphalt shingles,
including pictures of what GAF shingles looked like when placed
on the roof of a house.
dep.") pp. 23-24.
logo.

Deposition of Dewey C. MacKay ("MacKay

These materials carried the GAF Corporation

MacKay dep. pp. 23-24.

of GAF shingles by Pendleton.

He was also shown actual samples
MacKay dep. pp. 6, 21-22, 23-

24.
During these negotiations, Pendleton Builders
represented to Dr. MacKay that the GAF Slate Blend Timberline
asphalt shingle was GAF's top-of-the-line, self-sealing
shingle, which carried a 25 year guarantee and was made of the
highest quality asphalt.
26-27, 29-30.

MacKay dep. pp. 6-9, 20-21, 22-24,

These representations were later affirmed by

GAF's representatives, Mr. Don Fanter and Mr. Lawrence A.
Waddell.

MacKay dep. pp. 6-7, 20, 24, 29-30.

After

considering these representations, Dr. MacKay purchased the GAF

Slate Blend Timberline asphalt shingles.

MacKay dep. pp. 4, 5,

6, 7, 21-24f 26.
During May or Junef 1981, Dr. MacKay discovered that
the shingles had not sealed properly and had begun to curl.
MacKay dep. p. 10. Dr. MacKay contacted the GAF
representative, Don Fanter, who came out to Dr. MacKay's home,
reviewed the complaint and took a sample of the shingles for testing
purposes.

MacKay dep. pp.

For Summary Judgment, p. 3.

11-13; Memorandum In Support of Motion
The test results indicated that the

shingles were defective at the time of installation.

MacKay dep.

pp. 11-12; Memorandum In Support of Motion For Summary Judgment, p.
3.
Dr. MacKay was informed a number of times by GAF
representatives, subsequent to the testing, that its liability
was limited solely to that stated in its warranty in effect at
the time the shingles were installed, which amounted to $720.
MacKay dep. pp. 18-20, 22, 26, 29; MacKay dep. Exhibit A & B.
Dr. MacKay apparently never received a written version of the
warranty until some time subsequent to his complaint.

MacKay

dep. pp. 8-9, 22, 28. Dr. MacKay, in the meantime, had
obtained repair estimates from a number of roofing contractors
which indicated that the repair of the roof will cost about
$8000.

MacKay dep. pp. 15-16, 27.
Upon discovering the limited liability of GAF, Dr.

MacKay then complained to the appellant, which investigated the
complaint and then filed suit, alleging violations of the Utah

Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4 (Supp.
1983) .
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DIVISION
ONLY FOR
CAUSE OF
BUT ALSO
CAUSE OF

UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 13-11-17(1)(c) AUTHORIZES THE
OF CONSUMER PROTECTION TO RECOVER ACTUAL DAMAGES, NOT
THOSE CONSUMERS WHO COMPLAIN AFTER IT HAS FILED A
ACTION UNDER THE UTAH CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT,
FOR THE CONSUMERS WHOSE COMPLAINTS PRECIPITATE THE
ACTION.
Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas.. Utah, 608 P2d 242

(1980) stands for the principle that where doubt or uncertainty
as to the meaning or application of provisions of an act exist,
it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light
of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance
with legislative intent and purpose.
Young v. Barney, 20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P2d 846 (1967)
states the principle that in applying a rule or statute to a
given situation, the foremost objective should be to discover
the purpose for which the rule or statute was enacted.
Curtis v.

Harmon Electronics. Utah, 575 P2d 1044

(197 8) takes another approach where the court ruled that
application of statutes should not lead to incongruous results
or absurd consequences which were never intended.
Pursuant to these principles of law, the inquiry here
should be to determine what the purpose and effect are of Utah
Code Ann. Section 13-11-17(1)(c) (Supp. 1983).
Utah Code Ann. Section 13-11-17(1)(c) (Supp. 1983)
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provides as follows:
(1) The enforcing authority may bring an
action:
...(c) to recover, for each
violation, actual damages, or obtain
relief under subsection (2)(b), on behalf
of consumers who complained to the
enforcing authority within a reasonable
time after it instituted proceedings under

this chapter.
The underlined language is the amendment the Division
sought in the regular legislative session in 1983. The purpose
of the amendment was to correct what the Division perceived was
a statutory obstacle to its efforts to provide protection for
consumers who were actually damaged by a supplier's deceptive
and/or unconscionable acts or practices. This obstacle
presented itself whenever the Division of Consumer Protection
filed a suit under the statute.

Invariably, the filing of the

lawsuit generated additional complaints from consumers who had
likewise been injured but who, because of the language of the
prior statute, had no right to be included in the action or to
receive the protection afforded in the action.
The previous Utah Code Ann. Section 13-11-17(1)(c)
(Supp. 1981) read as follows:
(1) The enforcing authority may bring
an action:
...(c) to recover actual damages, or
obtain relief under subsection (2)(b), on
behalf of consumers who complained to the
enforcing authority before he institutued
proceedings under this Act.
This language was based on the provision in the
Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, approved by the National
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Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, and the
American Bar Association, in 1970. The Uniform Consumer Sales
Practices Act, U.L.A. Section 9 provided:
(a) The Enforcing Authority may bring an
action:
...(3) to recover actual damages, or
obtain relief under subsection (b)(2), on
behalf of consumers who complained to the
Enforcing Authority before he instituted
enforcement proceedings under this Act.
The Commissioners1 comments following Section 9
indicates that the enforcement authority is to be empowered
n

...to recover actual damages and other corrective relief on

behalf of consumers who complain to his office prior to
institution of enforcement proceedings." (Emphasis added.)
The perceived statutory obstacle to the Division
which precluded the Division from recovering actual damages on
behalf of consumers who complain after the Division has filed a
lawsuit was a valid perception.
Therefore, the legislature was presented with the
19 83 amendments for the express purpose of allowing the
Division to include, in any suit, the consumers who complain to
it after the suit is filed.
The Court below has applied and construed the amended
statute too narrowly and restrictively.

Such construction is

in direct conflict with Utah Code Ann. Section 13-11-2 (Supp.
1983), which indicates the purposes and policies of the Utah fc
Consumer Sales Practices Act.

The legislature intended the Act

to be construed liberally to protect consumers against the
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deceptive and/or unconscionable acts or practices of
suppliers.
If a liberal construction of the amended statute is
made, such construction would indicate the the Division is
entitled to seek actual damages for consumers who complain to
the Division prior to the filing of any lawsuit, as well as for
those consumers who complain to the Division after it has filed
a lawsuit.

To construe the statute otherwise leads to the

incongruous result that consumers are protected only after
complaining to the Division.

This result would mean that no

consumer would ever complain to the Division and that the
Division would have no reason to believe the law had been
violated.

True protection requires that both classes of

consumers be protected by the statute.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SINCE GENUINE AND MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT
EXIST WHICH REQUIRE A DETERMINATION BY A JURY OR TRIAL OF FACT.
For Summary Judgment to issue, the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and
affidavits must show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that movant is entitled to the judgment as a
matter of law.

Rule 56(c), URCP.

Respondent submits as material ten facts in its
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, pp 1-3.
ten material facts, Appellant has disputed four.
dispute are:
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Of these .

The facts in

1. The only warranty provided by defendant for
Timberline Shingles was a written Asphalt Shingle
Warranty, and that Dr. Mackay received such warranty.
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, para. 5;
Waddell Affidvait, para.6.
2. In 1974, Pendleton was not an authorized
representative or agent of the defendant and had no
power to extend any oral warranties with respect to
defendant's products. Memorandum in Support of
Summary Judgment, para. 6; Waddell Affidavit, para.
7.
3. Before July 19 81, the defendant had no knowledge
of any representation or affirmation of fact made by
Pendleton in connection with the sale and
installation of MacKay's roof in 1974. Memorandum in
Support of Summary Judgment, para. 9; Waddell
Affidavit, para. 8.
4. [The Waddell and O'Keefe letters] are the sole
basis for the allegations set forth in the second
cause of action of plaintiff's Complaint, Memorandum
in Support of Summary Judgment, para. 10.
The dispositive factual issue is whether Pendleton
Builders was an authorized representative or agent of GAF with
authority to make the express statements or warranties. Where
the question of agency is a principal issue in a case and the
evidence as to whether the agency exists is disputed, the
existence of the agency becomes a mixed question of law and
fact and is one for the jury to determine after proper
instruction from the court.

McCornick v. Queen of Sheba Gold

Min & Mill. Co,. 23 Utah 71, 63 P.820 (1900).
determination was not made by the jury.

Here, that

The court apparently

ruled on the issue as a matter of law.
Assuming arguendo that Pendleton Builders was an
agent and authorized to make statements and warranties, the

-8-

next material factual question is whether the statements of
Pendleton constituted an express warranty of affirmation of
fact or promise.

The question of whether a statement is a

warranty is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of
fact.

Park Yt flQQrntan Mfg, CQtr 121 Utah 339, 241 P.2d 914

(1952).

Again, no such findings were made on this point.
Another factual issue is whether GAF had knowledge of

the conduct of Pendleton Builders which would put GAF on notice
of Pendleton's apparent authority.
Knowledge under the Restatement, Agency 2d Section 9
(1957) depends on whether GAF had reason to know of Pendleton's
conduct or that it should have known of Pendleton's conduct.
Both of these conclusions require first a determination of
facts which would lead to such conclusion or to such a
reasonable inference.
The record below contains no such findings.
Furthermore, such findings should be made by the trier of fact
after consideration of evidence presented by both sides.
The final material issue of fact is whether in the
second cause of action a deceptive practice exists.

Respondent

claims that the O'Keefe and Waddell letters are the sole basis
of the cause of action and are not on their face deceptive.
This allegation implies that GAF committed no deceptive act or
practice.

In factf Respondent so argues in its Memorandum in

Support of Summary Judgment pp. 8-10.

However, Appellant's

position is that an express warranty was made by respondent's
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agent that warrantied the quality, nature, and longevity of the
GAF product.

The deceptive practice is the limiting of that

express warranty by the written documents from O'Keefe and
Waddell and the conduct of other GAF employees to the effect
that GAF has no liability for the defective shingles. The
factual issue is whether GAF engaged in such conduct and issued
such written documents and whether such factual circumstances
had the capacity to deceive Dr. MacKay.

Such findings again

should be made by the trier of fact after presentation of
evidence on the factual issue.
These material and genuine issues of fact require
resolution by the court below, after each side of the
controversy has presented evidence.

The court below has made

no findings as to these material and genuine factual issues,
and for such reason it erred.
POINT III
RESPONDENT GAF CORPORATION CLOTHED PENDLETON BUILDERS
WITH APPARENT AUTHORITY TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT ITS
PRODUCTS BY PREPARING, PROVIDING AND DISSEMINATING MATERIALS,
PICTURES, AND SAMPLES OF ITS PRODUCTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF
PROMOTING AND SELLING ITS PRODUCTS.
Corporate liability under the doctrine of apparent
authority is premised on the corporation having knowledge of
and acquiescing in the conduct of its agent, which caused a
third party to believe the agent was clothed with authority to
act for the corporation.

City Elec. v. Dean Evans Chrysler

Plymouth, Utah, 672 P.2d 89 (1983).

This principle is based

on the well-established rule that apparent authority can be
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inferred only from the acts and conduct of the principal.
Malia v. Giles, 100 Utah 2d 562 , 114 P.208 (1941).

Thus,

if a principal clothes an agent with apparent authority, all
collateral and incidental acts to the main authority will bind
the principal.

Bowen v. Olsen, Utah, 576 P.2d 862 (1978).

Furthermore, the principal may be estopped from denying the
apparent authorization of his agent if the principal's conduct
has lead a third party to believe the agent was acting for the
principal.

Forsythe vt Pendleton* Utah, 617 P.2d 358

(1980) .
A final rule which has application in this case is
that found in Standard Distributors v. Federal Trade
Commission, 211 F.2d 7 (2d. Cir. 1954), which held that when
no agent-principal relationship exists and the purported
principal engages another to sell his products, and therefore
is interested in the sales transactions, the risk that the
salesperson will make misrepresentations during the sales
transaction should be born by the purported principal as
opposed to the third party purchaser.
Application of the facts in Dr. MacKay's case to
these above principals establishes that GAF is liable for the
statements made by Pendleton Builders, during the sales
negotiations related to the sale of the shingles.
The first consideration requiring discussion is
whether GAF engaged in acts or conduct, brought about the
circumstances or was responsible for the circumstances which
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clothed Pendleton Builders with apparent authority, Santi v.

Denver & Rig Gcanfle Western RaUroacI CPt, Utah, 442 P2d 921
1968); Walker Bank & Trust Co, v. Jones, Utah, 672 P2d 73
1983) .
Appellant's position is that the materials, pictures,
samples and other literature which contained GAF logos created
a reasonable appearance that Pendleton was clothed with
apparent authority from GAF to sell the product, and therefore
authorized Pendleton to make statements about the shingles
which would promote the sale.
862 (1978).

Bowen v. Olsen, Utah, 576 P2d

That GAF acknowledged the efficacy of the sale is

substantiated by its affirmance that the shingles were its
product and subject to its warranty.

Answer, First Defense,

Paragraphs 10, 12; Memorandum In Support of Motion of Defendant
for Summary Judgment, Exhibits B, C.

Coopex Paintings & Coatingsi m e t Vt SQH
Corporation, 62 Tenn. App. 13, 457 S.W. 2d 864 (1970),
involved a similar factual situation.

In Cooper, the

plaintiff had purchased roofing material from defendant S
distributor.

An employee of the distributor furnished

brochures and technical manuals published by the defendant^f
manufacturer to the plaintiff which provided use and
application instructions of the roofing material. The
distributor's employee then met with plaintiff and discussed
the roofing project involved.

Shortly after application, the

roof leaked, and subsequently plaintiff sued the manufacturer
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for alleged breach of express and implied warranties and
misrepresentations of the fitness and suitability of the
materials*

The court held that while the distributor was not a

general agent of the manufacturer, it was a special agent, for
the purpose of advising prospective customers of the quality of
the product.

The court said on page 867:

If defendant's agent, Tennessee
Structural/ from which plaintiff purchased
the material/ did make material false
representations/ whether such were made on
its own or contained in materials furnished
to Tennessee Structural by defendant/ then
no problem of privity arises because such
representations would be binding upon the
defendant. It is uncontroverted the
plaintiff received from Tennessee
Structural written material containing
representations of fitness and suitability
of the defendant's products.
Unquestionably these materials were
prepared by the defendant and furnished to
Tennessee Structural for the prupose of
inducing sales of its products. Under
these circumstances it is inferable that
the defendant authorized and made Tennessee
Structural its agent for the purpose of
advising prospective customers of the
quality of its product.
Appellant argues that the materials received from
Pendleton Builders contained the alleged representation/ at
least as to the length of time the roof would last.

In his

deposition on pages 23 - 24r Dr. Mackay said about the GAF
materials:
A
Yes. They had various materials from GAF
explaining about the shingles. That's about all
I can say.
Q

Pictures?
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A
Pictures. Pictures of roofs and statements
as to various grades and that this was a 25-year
roof, whereas a lesser grade, which was less
money, was maybe only a 15 year.
Q
Was the GAF symbol or logo on any of this
material?
A
I would be stretching the point if I said
absolutely I know that's the case, but I — it
certainly is my impression that that was the
situation. That they were the — I do remember
that they were presenting me a Timberline
shingle and they had various colors. They
showed me the various types, showing me pictures
of roofs. I am certain, you know, that GAF's
name was on all of it.
Q
And you indicated something about a price
sheet?
A
Well, just they presented me with various
prices.
Q
Did they leave this material with you to
review or did i t —
A

I think so.

This evidence also raises the inference that the
representations as to top-of-the-line, self-sealing,
guarenteed for 25 years, and made from the highest grade
asphalt could have been contained in the materials as well.
Even if such representations were not made in the literature,
still, GAF should be held responsible, under the Cooper case,
since the furnishing of the materials clothed Pendleton
Builders with the apparent authority to advise prospective
customers of the quality, nature and longevity of its
products.
The Utah Court has agreed that principals can
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apparently authorize special agents for the purpose of giving
information or making statements or representations.

In

Wasatch Chemical Co. v. Leon, Utah, 259 P2d 301, 302 (1957),
the court, in addressing whether a non-selling agent had
implied authority to make any warranty or representation about
the effect of weed killer said:
As stated in 2 Mechem on Agencies, 2nd Ed. Sec. 177 8:
It is not at all uncommon for the principal
to put an agent in a position in which the
making of statements or representations or
the giving of information is the act
expressly contemplated and directed. Thus
if the principal refers a person to his
agent for information, the agent is clearly
authorized to give information for the
principal upon the subject indicated.
GAF placed Pendleton Builders in a position which
expressly contemplated and directed that it give information
and statements about GAF products for the purpose of selling
them.

The very fact that Pendleton Builders was in possession

of these materials and that GAF attempted to limit its
liability through the use of the shingle warranty is evidence
of such express contemplation and direction.

Vernon v. Lake

MQtPrS, Utah, 488 P2d 302 (1971) and Curtis v. CIA Machinery,
Inc. . Okla. App., 571 P2d 862 also make similar holdings.
Therefore, in consideration of these cases and facts,
GAF did clothe Pendleton Builders with apparent authority to
make representations about its product for the purpose of
selling the same.
The second consideration is whether GAF had knowledge
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of and acquiesced in the conduct engaged in by Pendleton
Builders/ which caused Dr. MacKay to believe that Pendleton was
authorized to act for GAF.
Appellant's position is that GAF did have knowledge
of Pendleton Builders1 conduct and acquiesced in the same.
Restatement/ Agency 2d Section 9(1) (1957) says that
"[a] person has notice of a fact if he knows the fact/ has
reason to know itf should know itf or has been given
notification of it."
GAF had reason to know of the conduct of Pendleton
Builders/ or at least it should have known about it. The
promotional materials Pendleton Builders presented to Dr.
MacKay contained the GAF logo.

Presumably/ GAF prepared the

promotional materials for the express purpose of disseminating
them to retail sellers in its chain of distribution.

It knewf

or should have knownf that the materials/ samples, pictures and
other literature promoting its products would be used by
retailers to sell and make statements about its products.
While GAF did not specifically know about Pendleton Builders
and its particular conduct/ GAFf under the rulef did knowf or
should have known that retailers would use and distribute the
materials for the purpose for which they were prepared.
Furthermore/ GAF utilized/ according to the Waddell
Affidavit/ a written warranty which/ upon inspection/ requires
the affirming signature of the contractor.

Waddell Affidavit;

Exhibit Af Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
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Judgment.

GAF therefore knew of the existence of a class of

retailers which would be using and installing its shingles and
acting for it.

Pendleton Builders was in that class, and at

least generically, GAF should be charged with knowledge of such
class1 conduct.
Acquiescence by GAF is also demonstrated by the
facts.
Restatement, Agency 2d, Section 43(a) (1957)
provides
Acquiescence by the principal in conduct of
an agent whose previously conferred
authorization reasonably might include it,
indicates that the conduct was authorized;
if clearly not included in the
authorization, acquiescence in it indicates
affirmance.
Pendleton Builders1 conduct was the making of
statements about the quality, nature, and length of life of GAF
products.

The authority to make such statements and

representations about the shingles was derived from the
providing of the promotional and sales materials by GAF.
Nothing in the record indicates that GAF dissented to or
protested against that conduct.

In fact, the very sale of the

shingles itself and subsequent application of the written
warranty indicate acquiescence in the conduct.

Furthermore,

the record indicates that the representations were affirmed by
Mr. Fanter and Mr. Waddell, Mackay dep. pp. 6-7, 20, 24, 29-10.
Under the Restatement rule then, Pendleton Builders1 conduct
was authorized by virtue of GAF acquiescence.
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A third consideration to be made in regard to
apparent authority is whether GAF should be estopped from
denying the authority of Pendleton Builders.

The court in santi Vt.Denver anfl Rio Gcanfle Western
Railroad Co, . Utah, 442 P.2d 921, 923 (1968) stated:
• . . [w]e recognize that there may be
circumstances created by the principal, or
for which it is responsible, and upon which
a third party reasonably can and does rely,
and in which instance the principal may be
bound by the representation made.
Bank of Salt Lake v. Corporation of Pres. of Ch. ,
etc..

Utah, 534 P.2d 887, 891 (1975), in discussing the bank's

claim of estoppel based on apparent authority said:
"Manifestation sufficient to support a claim of reliance on an
agent's apparent authority must come from the principal,"
Both cases apply to the appellant's case.

GAF

created and was responsible for the circumstances upon which
Dr. Mackay reasonably could and did rely.

The manifestation of

apparent authority came from GAF, as discussed previously.
The deposition of Dr. MacKay indicates that he relied
on the GAF materials supplied by Pendleton Builders and on the
representations of Pendleton Builders in the purchase of the
shingles, MacKay dep. pp. 4, 5, 6, 7, 21-24, 26.
reasonable for him to do so.

It was

Pendleton Builders had materials

and information apparently prepared by GAF to promote its
shingles, and he had no reason or indication that he should
inquire elsewhere.

He had the opportunity to review the
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materials and then made his choice*
expected of him.

Nothing further could be

GAF should be estopped from denying Pendleton

Builders' authority to act on its behalf.
The final consideration is that even if Pendleton
was not authorized by GAF's conduct or authority to act as an
agent, it should still be held liable.
Appellant argues that under the principle of

Stanford PistributPrs v> Federal Trade CQnwissionr 211 F2d
7, 15 (2nd Cir. 1954) , GAF is still responsible for the
statements and conduct of Pendleton Builders.

Standard

Distributors involved a cease and desist order issued by the
FTC against the corporation and its president for unfair and
deceptive practices in violation of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, Section 5, as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. Section 45.
The alleged violations involved misrepresentations to customers
by salesmen of the company in the sale of encyclopedias. The
corporation and president asked the court to set aside the
order on a number of bases, one of which was that the agent
salesmen had acted beyond the scope of their authority.

The

court found that the misrepresentations had been made in the
scope of their apparent authority, and even though attempts
were made by the corporation to prevent the misrepresentations,
it was bound by the salesmenfs acts, and therefore the order
was proper.
In regard to the corporation's president, the court
held that the salesmen were not his agents and that the sales
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were not for his benefit.

Howeverf he was in overall charge of

the salesmen and was to that extent interested in their
ventures.

In discussing the president's status as a

nonprincipal, the court said:
It is indeed true that this results in
holding such an officer responsible for the
conduct of those who are not his agents;
and, moreover, that it deprives him of the
immunity that the incorporation of a
venture ordinarily gives to the
incorporators. However, we do not see that
it is any severer a responsbiltiy than that
of a principal for the conduct of his
agent within the scope of an "apparent
authority" that he may have done his best
to circumscribe. It is true that "apparent
authority" has at times been said to result
from estoppel; but that is not true, for
the principal is heldf even though the
third person does not rely in any way upon
the authority; as for example, in the case
of a tort. As Professor Wigmore long ago
pointed out, the doctrine in such cases is
a more or less rationalized vestige of
altogether different notions whose
provenience goes back to the archaic law of
status. So far as it any longer satisfies
our present demands of justice, it is
because, since the principal has selected
the agent to act in a venture in which the
principal is interested, it is fair, as
between him and a third person, to impose
upon him the risk that the agent may exceed
his instructions—subject, indeed, to
limits, vaguely left open, upon his
"apparent authority."
Much the same argument seems to us to
be permissible, when, as here, no agency
exists. Bimstein had the entire control
over what the salesmen should do and say,
so far as any control was possible at all;
and the order imposes no greater burden on
him than it would have, if he had been a
formal principal; for the salesmen did not
exceed their "apparent authority."
Appellant argues that this same principle applies to

-20-

Dr. MacKayfs case.

GAF was interested in the venture between

Pendleton Builders and Dr. MacKay.

Indeed, it benefited

therefromf since the product it produced and placed in the
distribution chain was to be sold to the ultimate user. Toward
that end, GAF had prepared its materials and literature and had
put in place a system of distribution, a part of which included
contractors like Pendleton Builders.

GAF expected its product

to be sold through that system and relys on such a system for
its sustenance.

Because of this interested and benficial

relationship, it is more fair and equitable that GAF should
bear the risk from representations made in the chain of
distribution by sellers of its product and from defects in its
products than Dr. MacKay who purchased the product, relying
thereon.
The rule of Standard Distributors suggests that GAF
should be held responsible for Pendleton's statements about the
quality, nature and longevity of GAF products, even if
Pendleton Builders was not authorized to act on GAF's behalf.
CONCLUSION
Since the purpose and intent of the language
amending Utah Code Ann. Section 13-11-17(1)(c) was to allow the
appellant to bring suit for actual damages for consumers whose
complaints initiate an investigation, but also to recover
actual damages for consumers who complain after the Division
files suit, Appellant was not in error in bringing its action
based on Dr. MacKay's complaint.
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Furthermore, GAF clothed Pendleton Builders with
apparent authority to make statements about the quality, nature
and longevity of its shingles by providing Pendleton Builders
with promotional and sales materials for such purpose.

GAF had

reason to know or should have known that Pendleton Builders was
its agent who was clothed with apparent authority and who acted
as it did under the circumstances.

Also, GAF was interested

in and benefitted from the conduct of its agent, and therefore
as against Dr. MacKay, GAF should bear the risk of the agent's
conduct.
Finally, the record below indicates that at least
four genuine and material issues of fact exist upon which
evidence must be presented before factual findings can be made.
The Court below made findings without basis in the record
and/or failed to make findings upon which its final judgment
was based.

In both cases, such findings must be made by a

trier-of-fact relying on evidence presented in trial.
The order of the Court below should be reversed and
this case should be remanded to the Court below for trial on
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the factual issues presented.
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of May, 1984.
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